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Bosh and the Constitutional Cause of Action: The Corridor 
to Civil Liberties  
I. Introduction 
The year 2012 saw 142,976 arrests in Oklahoma.1 Put simply, prior to 
Bosh v. Cherokee County Building Authority,2 2012 offered nearly 143,000 
opportunities for law enforcement to disregard Oklahomans’ civil rights by 
imposing excessive force on pre-incarcerated arrestees. These citizens had 
no way, either through statute or judicially created remedy, to recover 
against the State of Oklahoma in tort. If the primary purpose of tort law is 
to make the victim whole again, it had been derelict in its duty.3 Oklahoma 
law had acknowledged a wrong but offered no remedy.  
Imagine. Officers are booking you into an Oklahoma jail for a nonviolent 
crime.4 You stand at the booking desk, hands in cuffs behind your back, 
while the jail employee (clearly in no hurry) methodically plows his way 
through the necessary paperwork. Granted, you are in no rush to be booked. 
But the jailer’s lack of sympathy towards you—a first time arrestee—is 
annoying. Tempers flare. You utter a snarky comment under your breath. 
The jailer at your side takes offense. More words are traded. The encounter 
leaves you, still with your hands restrained behind your back, on the 
ground—battered, bruised, beaten. 
You are the victim of an unnecessary, violent attack by a government 
employee. You would sue Oklahoma, whose jailer left you with gashes on 
your face, bruised ribs, and broken limbs, if not for one problem: the State 
of Oklahoma is immune from suit under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort 
Claims Act (OGTCA).  
This Note examines a citizen’s right to bring a private cause of action 
against Oklahoma for violating the Oklahoma Constitution, despite the 
existence of state sovereign immunity codified in the OGTCA. Part II 
narrates this right’s evolution up until Bosh v. Cherokee County Building 
Authority.5 Part III details Bosh’s facts and the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s 
                                                                                                                 
 1. OKLA. STATE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, STATE OF OKLAHOMA UNIFORM CRIME 
REPORT: ANNUAL REPORT JANUARY—DECEMBER 2012, at 1-4, http://www.ok.gov/osbi/ 
documents/2012%20UCR%20Annual%20Report.pdf.  
 2. 2013 OK 9, 305 P.3d 994. 
 3. 74 AM. JUR. 2D Torts § 2 (2012). 
 4. Perhaps you forgot to pay for a traffic ticket. 
 5. 2013 OK 9, 305 P.3d 994. 
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analysis finding that a private cause of action exists under the Oklahoma 
Constitution. Part IV does three things. First, it demonstrates the now 
widespread confusion in state and federal courts regarding Bosh’s scope. 
Second, and more importantly, it examines the drastic implications for state 
liability and civil liberties that will ensue when the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court clarifies Bosh’s holding. Finally, Part IV also houses the thesis of this 
Note. Because Oklahomans’ civil rights depend on Bosh’s scope, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court should unanimously acknowledge that the 
Oklahoma Constitution provides other private causes of action despite the 
OGTCA. This decision will have two effects. First, it will bestow upon 
Oklahomans the same rights that many other states already grant their own 
citizens. Two, it will promote responsible law enforcement and government 
conduct. 
II. Law Before Bosh 
A. Sovereign Immunity Is Codified: Birth of the Oklahoma Governmental 
Tort Claims Act 
In 1978, Oklahoma enacted the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims 
Act (OGTCA).6 In theory, the Act waives governmental immunity. But in 
practice, it provides several instances where the state, its municipalities, and 
their employees still enjoy immunity. One such instance is in operating jails 
and correctional facilities. Section 155 of the OGTCA provides that “[t]he 
state or a political subdivision shall not be liable if a loss or claim results 
from . . . [p]rovision, equipping, operation or maintenance of any prison, 
jail or correctional facility, or injuries . . . .”7 Prior to 1978, the judiciary 
had immunized the state from all liability.8 The OGTCA was the state’s 
way of voluntarily chiseling away at that immunity. 
                                                                                                                 
 6. 51 OKLA. STAT. § 151 (Supp. 2014). The Act provides, 
 (A) The State of Oklahoma does hereby adopt the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity. The state, its political subdivisions, and all of their employees acting 
within the scope of their employment, whether performing governmental or 
proprietary functions, shall be immune from liability for torts. 
 (B) The state, only to the extent and in the manner provided in this act, 
waives its immunity and that of its political subdivisions. In so waiving 
immunity, it is not the intent of the state to waive any rights under the Eleventh 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Id. 
 7. Id. § 155. 
 8. See, e.g., Vanderpool v. State, 1983 OK 82, 672 P.2d 1153, 1157. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss3/5
2016]       NOTES 623 
 
 
Then in 1983, the Oklahoma Supreme Court abrogated the judicially 
created doctrine of sovereign immunity in Vanderpool v. State.9 In 
Vanderpool, a lawnmower, operated by an Oklahoma Historical Society 
employee, propelled a rock into a co-worker’s eye.10 The accident robbed 
the plaintiff of her vision, and she sought recovery.11 By overturning the 
trial court’s summary judgment to the State, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
refused to immunize the state from tort liability in the absence of a statute 
expressly conferring sovereign immunity.12 To the court, the presence of 
the OGTCA meant that judicially created sovereign immunity no longer 
had a purpose; it was “no longer supportable in reason, justice or in light of 
the overwhelming trend against its recognition . . . .”13 And because the 
“reason for the rule no longer exists, that alone should toll its death knell.”14  
And with that, the Oklahoma Supreme Court discarded the common law 
doctrine of sovereign immunity, and the OGTCA became the “exclusive 
remedy for an injured plaintiff to recover against a governmental entity in 
tort.”15 
B. Washington v. Barry: The Court Finally Recognizes the Constitutional 
Cause of Action 
Nearly twenty years passed before the landscape of state sovereign 
immunity was again shaken up in Washington v. Barry.16 In Washington, 
the plaintiff, a prisoner at a state penitentiary in McAlester, sued the prison 
employees under the OGTCA, alleging they used “unreasonable force” 
when they removed his handcuffs and leg irons.17 The OGTCA, however, 
barred plaintiff’s claim because the Act provided immunity to the state and 
its employees for operating any jail or correctional facility.18 But the court 
added a caveat: though petitioner had not claimed it, a cause of action still 
existed under the Oklahoma Constitution so long as the force was so 
excessive that it qualified as cruel and unusual punishment, which is 
prohibited by the Oklahoma Constitution’s article 2, section 9.19 Granted, 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. ¶ 2, 672 P.2d at 1153. 
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. ¶¶ 24-25, 672 P.2d at 1156.  
 13. Id. ¶ 27, 672 P.2d at 1157. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Bosh v. Cherokee Cty. Bldg. Auth., 2013 OK 9, ¶ 15, 305 P. 3d 994, 1000. 
 16. 2002 OK 45, 55 P.3d 1036. 
 17. Id. ¶ 2, 55 P.3d at 1038. 
 18. 51 OKLA. STAT. § 151 (Supp. 2014). 
 19. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 9. 
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Washington’s holding was ostensibly limited to instances where a prisoner 
experienced excessive force. But the significance remained: for the first 
time in its nearly century-long existence, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
declared that a private cause of action exists when the state violates a 
constitutional right.  
III. Statement of the Case 
In a sense, Bosh is unsurprising. The Oklahoma Supreme Court had 
already declared, albeit eleven years earlier in Washington, that even prison 
inmates could sue for excessive force under the Oklahoma Constitution’s 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.20 It followed that a cause 
of action could exist for arrestees, or “persons who were not already 
incarcerated inmates, because they have significantly broader rights.”21 The 
inmate in Washington only lost because he did not bring an excessive-force 
claim.22 Regardless, Washington advanced civil rights—an advancement 
not forgotten by the Bosh court when it noted that Washington portended 
the court’s decision.23  
A. The Facts of Bosh 
Bosh’s facts do not garner sympathy for the state jailers. And his 
experience illustrates the dangers of immunizing certain governmental 
functions. After his May 2011 arrest, Daniel Bosh stood at the booking desk 
of the Cherokee County Detention Center, a facility operated by the 
Cherokee County Governmental Building Authority (Authority).24 His 
hands were secured in restraints behind his back.25 He was “[p]resumably” 
being booked into the jail, but it is unclear (1) why Bosh was standing at the 
booking desk; (2) why he was restrained; (3) what he was restrained with; 
(4) what crime he was charged with, if any; or (5) whether he had even 
been convicted.26  
                                                                                                                 
 20. Washington v. Barry, 2002 OK 45, ¶ 10, 55 P.3d 1036, 1039 (finding that cause of 
action existed under article 2, section 9 of the Oklahoma Constitution, which states, 
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual 
punishments inflicted.”). 
 21. Bosh, ¶ 21, 305 P.3d at 1001. 
 22. Id. ¶ 10, 305 P.3d at 998. 
 23. Id. ¶ 26, 305 P.3d at 1002. 
 24. Id. ¶ 2, 305 P.3d at 996.  
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. Strangely, the lower court had explained that Bosh was arrested for failure to pay 
a traffic ticket. Id. While standing at the booking desk, Bosh asked to have his handcuffs 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss3/5
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What is clear is what video surveillance captured next.27 One jailer 
approached the restrained Bosh, grabbed the back of Bosh’s neck, and 
slammed Bosh’s head into the booking desk.28 But the jailer was not 
finished. He placed Bosh’s head underneath his arm and deliberately fell 
backwards, causing Bosh to strike the crown of his head on the floor.29 
Other jailers joined in and moved Bosh to the showers, outside of video 
surveillance.30 The assault continued off camera.31 
Bosh’s injuries were severe. The jailers left Bosh to “languish” in his cell 
for two days before taking him to the hospital, where physicians discovered 
fractured vertebrae and attempted to surgically fuse several of the discs 
along Bosh’s spinal cord.32 Bosh is today supported by two rods and ten 
screws implanted into his back and neck and has difficulty walking. He can 
neither cook for nor play with his two young sons without pain.33  
B. Procedural History and Issue Presented 
Bosh sued the Authority, the assistant jail administrator, and his attackers 
in state court.34 He asserted two types of claims: (1) civil rights claims 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the individuals and (2) state tort-law claims 
against the Authority. 
The Authority removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss 
the state tort claims based on exemptions from liability provided by the 
OGTCA. The federal district court granted the motion but allowed Bosh to 
amend his complaint to add an excessive-force claim under article 2, 
section 30 of the Oklahoma Constitution.35 That provision, a corollary to 
the U.S. Constitution’s Fourth Amendment, guarantees “[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against 
                                                                                                                 
loosened, and the jailor initiated the attack. Bosh v. Cherokee Cnty. Bldg. Auth., No. 11–
CV–376–JHP, 2012 WL 3758155, at *1 (E.D. Okla. Aug. 30, 2012). 
 27. Bosh’s counsel would later proffer video footage of the attack to local news sources. 
Russell Hulstine & Lori Fullbright, Booking Video Released In Lawsuit Against Cherokee 
County Jail, NEWSON6 (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.newson6.com/story/16320948/booking-
video-released-in-lawsuit-against-cherokee-county-jail. 
 28. Bosh, ¶ 3, 305 P.3d at 996. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. ¶¶ 3-4, 305 P.3d at 996. 
 33. Hulstine & Fullbright, supra note 27.  
 34. Bosh, ¶ 4, 305 P.3d at 996. 
 35. Id. ¶ 5, 305 P.3d at 997. 
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unreasonable searches or seizures shall not be violated . . . .”36 After Bosh 
added the recommended excessive-force claim, the Authority again moved 
to dismiss.37 The federal court then certified several questions to the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court, including, “Does the Okla. Const. art. 2, § 30 
provide a private cause of action for excessive force, notwithstanding the 
limitations of the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act?”38 In other 
words, may a nonincarcerated Oklahoma citizen sue the state under article 
2, section 30 of the Oklahoma Constitution—which prohibits unreasonable 
searches and seizures—for damages suffered during an attack by its jailers 
despite the jail’s apparent immunity under the OGTCA? 
C. The Court’s Decision 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court said yes. It first acknowledged the 
obvious: the Oklahoma Constitution clearly conflicts with the OGTCA, 
which seemingly “allow[s] the state, or, in this case the Authority, to elude 
tort liability when its employees beat and injure a citizen who is detained in 
one of its facilities.”39 In the face of this conflict, the OGTCA bows to the 
Oklahoma Constitution, whose “art. 2, § 30 protects citizens from being 
physically abused by the employees of state and local entities that operate 
jails and correctional facilities, and such protection includes legal liability 
for such conduct.”40  
The court then grappled with whether respondeat superior applied.41 If it 
did, the Authority was liable for its jailers’ misconduct. If it did not, 
recognizing Bosh’s right to sue for excessive force would be futile because 
Bosh would not be able to recover from the Authority. The court admitted 
that while claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot impose vicarious 
liability, “Oklahoma is not bound by the constraints of federal law when 
determining whether the doctrine of respondeat superior serves as a basis 
for municipal liability under a cause of action for excessive force pursuant 
to the Okla. Const. art. 2, § 30.”42 Besides, Oklahoma already used 
respondeat superior to hold municipalities liable under the OGTCA.43 In 
                                                                                                                 
 36. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 30. 
 37. Bosh, ¶ 6, 305 P.3d at 997. 
 38. Id. ¶ 0, 305 P.3d at 995-96 (internal citation omitted). 
 39. Id. ¶ 7, 305 P.3d at 997-98 (footnote omitted). 
 40. Id. ¶ 8, 305 P.3d at 997. 
 41. Id. ¶ 28, 305 P.3d at 1003. 
 42. Id. ¶ 29, 305 P.3d at 1003 (emphasis omitted). 
 43. Id. ¶ 30, 305 P.3d at 1003. 
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other words, Oklahoma was not required to mirror the federal government’s 
standards for governmental liability.  
To show that respondeat superior applied, the court rehashed the facts of 
Washington v. Barry, where the court first acknowledged that a prisoner 
could sue for excessive force under article 2, section 9 of the Oklahoma 
Constitution.44 The Bosh court reviewed its constitutional tort jurisprudence 
by framing its three observations from Washington. One, the OGTCA bars 
tort claims for assault and battery and intentional infliction of mental 
anguish and emotional distress.45 But, two, prisoners can still sue for 
excessive force under the Oklahoma Constitution so long as the force was 
so excessive that it qualified as cruel and unusual punishment under the 
Oklahoma Constitution.46 And, three, arrestees and pre-incarcerated 
inmates have a lower burden of proof for excessive force claims because 
they have broader rights than prison inmates.47 Thus, the court’s 
hypothetical from Washington served as precedent; in Bosh’s case, the 
Authority could not flout responsibility by using the OGTCA as a shield or 
by claiming respondeat superior did not apply.48 
But the Bosh court then appeared to narrow its answer to the federal 
court’s certified question. Article 2, section 30, it explained, applies to 
seized citizens, or “arrestees and pre-incarcerated detainees.”49 And because 
even incarcerated individuals may bring excessive-force claims under 
article 2, section 9, “it would defy reason to hold that pre-incarcerated 
detainees and arrestees are not provided at least the same protections of 
their rights, the same cause of action for excessive force under the Okla. 
Const. art 2, § 30.”50 For the first time, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held a 
citizen could recover against a municipality for violating his constitutional 
rights. True, Washington had recognized that right. But Bosh would 
actually be able to impose liability in federal court. The Oklahoma Supreme 
Court, however, was seemingly unwilling to recognize constitutional claims 
where there was no (1) excessive force or (2) “seizure.”51 
So there was hope for Bosh: while the OGTCA barred his tort claim, he 
could still sue under article 2, section 30 of the Oklahoma Constitution. 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Id. (discussing Washington v. Barry, 2002 OK 45, ¶¶ 9-18, 55 P.3d 1036, 1039-42). 
 45. Id. ¶ 20, 305 P.3d at 1001. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. ¶ 21, 305 P.3d at 1001. 
 48. Id. ¶¶ 16-20, 305 P.3d at 1000-01. 
 49. Id. ¶ 22, 305 P.3d at 1001.  
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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Both precedent and a concern for constitutional liberties bolstered the 
court’s decision. Precedent held the OGTCA could not “provid[e] blanket 
immunity.”52 And to find for the Authority would “render the Constitutional 
protections afforded the citizens of this State as ineffective, and a nullity.”53 
At the least, Bosh says that Oklahoma cannot immunize the reckless 
conduct of its jailers when doing so conflicts with the Oklahoma 
Constitution. 
Bosh thus illuminated the rights of arrested and incarcerated 
individuals—who are no longer “at the mercy of their captors to be beaten, 
assaulted, and left without medical attention without any remedy to deter 
such conduct.”54 But Bosh left the constitutional rights of non-arrested 
citizens to sue under the Oklahoma Constitution in the dark.  
IV. Bosh’s Ramifications: Unlocking the Door to Civil Liberties 
A. In the Wake of Bosh, Questions Abound 
Since Bosh, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has delivered only one 
clarification: “claim[s] for excessive force, as applied to police officers and 
other law enforcement personnel, may not be brought against a 
municipality when a cause of action under the OGTCA is available.”55 
Draconian? Yes. Commonsensical? Moreso. After all, there is “no rationale 
requiring the extension of a Bosh excessive force action” brought under the 
constitution when one already exists under the OGTCA.56 
But Bosh’s scope is still unclear. For one, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
recognized a citizen’s constitutional right to bring excessive-force claims 
against the state under article 2, section 30 of the Oklahoma Constitution.57 
Confusingly, though, article 2, section 30 makes no mention of excessive 
force, and ensures only that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches or 
seizures shall not be violated . . . .”58 
True, Washington previously acknowledged that prison inmates could 
sue for excessive force under article 2, section 9—which also makes no 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Id. ¶ 23, 305 P.3d at 1001. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. ¶ 17, 305 P.3d at 1000. 
 55. Perry v. City of Norman, 2014 OK 119, ¶ 1, 341 P.3d 689, 689. 
 56. Id. ¶ 19, 341 P.3d at 693. 
 57. Bosh, ¶ 32, 305 P.3d at 1004. 
 58. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 30. 
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mention of excessive force.59 Yet that decision at least made more sense 
because that provision prohibits using cruel and unusual punishment. It also 
made sense because recognizing this right in Washington was not 
unprecedented. Oklahoma is far from the first state to recognize a private 
cause of action under its state constitution.60 States have recognized causes 
of action for a variety of claims, including for illegal search and seizure and 
the use of cruel and unusual punishment.61 In other words, it was not 
surprising that the Washington court found a constitutional claim for 
excessive force in the constitution’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment. But Bosh’s reliance on section 30—a provision that makes no 
mention of excessive force or cruel and unusual punishment—is strange. 
And adding to the confusion, the court’s lofty language regarding 
constitutional liberties,62 especially when contrasted with its cursory 
analysis, calls Bosh’s scope into question. 
1.Do Bosh Claims Require an Arrest? 
The court’s decision to allow Bosh to sue for excessive force under a 
constitutional provision that does not mention excessive force is 
undoubtedly odd. But just as curious is the court’s limiting of its holding, 
restrictively labeling those who were the subjects of “excessive force” as 
“arrestees and pre-incarcerated detainees,” rather than those who are merely 
seized but not officially arrested.63 Hopefully this phrasing does not signal 
the inability of non-arrested individuals to sue for excessive force or that no 
constitutional remedy exists for those who are unlawfully searched and 
seized but do not experience excessive force.  
Perhaps noteworthy is that the Bosh court, in declaring that article 2, 
section 30 provides a private cause of action for excessive force despite the 
OGTCA, cites to Binette v. Sabo—a Connecticut case recognizing a 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Washington v. Barry, 2002 OK 45, ¶ 10, 55 P.3d 1036, 1039. 
 60. Sharon N. Humble, Annotation, Implied Cause of Action for Damages for Violation 
of Provisions of State Constitutions, 75 A.L.R. 5th 619 (2000). 
 61. See, e.g., Binette v. Sabo, 710 A.2d 688 (Conn. 1998) (search and seizure). But see, 
e.g., Giraldo v. Calif. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 371 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008), 
review denied, (Feb. 11, 2009) (finding no private right of action for damages arising out of 
an alleged violation of the California Constitution’s cruel and unusual punishment clause). 
 62. Bosh, ¶ 23, 305 P.3d at 1001 (“The OGTCA cannot be construed as immunizing the 
state completely from all liability for violations of the constitutional rights of its citizens. To 
do so would not only fail to conform to established precedent which refused to construe the 
OGTCA as providing blanket immunity, but would also render the Constitutional protections 
afforded the citizens of this State as ineffective, and a nullity.”). 
 63. Bosh, ¶ 22, 305 P.3d at 1001. 
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constitutional tort claim for unreasonable search and seizure.64 Bosh 
characterizes Binette as (1) creating a “private, Constitutional right of 
action for money damages against officials stemming form [sic] alleged 
violations of search and seizure and arrest” and (2) “recogniz[ing] that 
compelling policy considerations favored the creation of a constitutional 
tort to ensure the citizens a remedy when their constitutional rights were 
violated by a police officer or similar actor.”65 So unlike Bosh, Binette 
recognizes a private cause of action to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures—not excessive force, as Bosh facially does. Though the Bosh 
court ostensibly limits its holding to arrestees and pre-incarcerated 
individuals, its cite to Binette implicitly suggests that recognition of other 
causes of action under the Oklahoma Constitution might lie on the judicial 
horizon. Or at least the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals agrees; it holds 
that Bosh is not limited to excessive force claims under article 2, section 
30.66  
2. Bosh’s Reasoning: Unique or Unclear? 
More perplexing is that Bosh’s analysis, or the lack of it, does not fit the 
mold of other state supreme court decisions that have recognized 
constitutional rights of action. According to American Law Reports, state 
courts recognizing these rights usually pattern their reasoning on section 
874A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, common law, or analogies to 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 
where the U.S. Supreme Court first recognized a private cause of action 
under the Fourth Amendment.67 
Bosh, then, is either unique or unclear. It is not rooted in tort law—the 
court certified the question of whether a private cause of action exists under 
article 2, section 30 of the Oklahoma Constitution only after the federal 
district court granted the Authority’s motion to dismiss Bosh’s state tort 
claims.68 This makes sense: because of the OGTCA, Bosh’s right to sue 
could not rest in statutory tort law.  
                                                                                                                 
 64. Bosh, ¶ 23, 305 P.3d at 1001 n.33; Binette, 710 A.2d at 688. 
 65. See Bosh, ¶ 23, 305 P.3d at 1001 n.33; see also White v. City of Tulsa, 979 F. Supp. 
2d 1246, 1249-50 (N.D. Okla. 2013) (discussing Bosh footnote 33 and why Bosh should be 
interpreted as providing a cause of action for all provisions of article 2, section 9 of the 
Oklahoma Constitution). 
 66. GJA v. Okla. Dep't of Human Servs., 2015 OK CIV APP 32, ¶¶ 30-32, 347 P.3d 
310, 316.  
 67. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 68. Bosh, ¶¶ 1, 5, 305 P.3d at 996-97. 
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Still, the decision could be based on common law—but there was no 
mention of any common law right to sue the state. It could be based on 
Bivens since footnote 33 acknowledges that Binette is based on Bivens. But 
Bosh omits any other reference to Bivens or the right to sue under the U.S. 
Constitution.69 
Acknowledging that Bosh recognizes a private cause of action is not 
enough. More important is the court’s reasoning; understanding how the 
court found a private cause of action under the Oklahoma Constitution is 
essential to understanding Bosh and discerning whether the court will 
recognize additional constitutional claims in the future. 
a) No Reliance on the Second Restatement of Torts 
Though some state courts recognize a private cause of action under the 
state constitution by citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Oklahoma 
did not.70 Section 874A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts encourages 
courts to create a remedy where a statute has not provided one: 
When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by 
proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a 
civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it determines that 
the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the 
legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the 
provision, accord to an injured member of the class a right of 
action, using a suitable existing tort action or a new cause of 
action analogous to an existing tort action.71 
While not dispositive, the court’s decision not to ground its holding in 
section 874A could suggest a limited holding. The court might have 
realized that if it recognized Bosh’s claim on the basis of the broad 
language of section 874A, it would open the constitutional floodgates. 
Plaintiffs could then use Bosh’s citation to the Restatement to press many 
never-before-recognized claims under statutes and constitutional provisions 
that—perhaps deliberately—provide no remedy. But this reasoning is 
superficial, mostly because a primary purpose of a constitution is to check 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Id. ¶ 23, 305 P.3d at 1001 n.33. 
 70. Humble, supra note 60, § 3[a]. 
 71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: TORT LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OF LEGISLATIVE 
PROVISION § 874A (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
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political branches.72 After all, the Bill of Rights (and Oklahoma’s 
equivalent in Article 2) is “intended to vindicate the interests of the 
individual in the face of the popular will as expressed in legislative 
majorities . . . .”73  
Perhaps the court thought it better in Bosh’s case to recognize a limited 
instance where a claimant might recover for a violation of constitutional 
right rather than have its broad analysis used to argue that every statute, 
whether it offered a remedy or not, provided a cause of action. In other 
words, it was better to methodically expand its Bosh holding in due time 
than to abruptly limit its scope months from now to the detriment of an 
unsuspecting plaintiff. Regardless, this reasoning contradicts the spirit of 
constitutional rights.  
b) In Search of Common Law 
Also absent from Bosh is any mention of common law. This omission is 
troubling, particularly because common law is founded on the notion that a 
remedy exists for every wrong.74 That a wrong is a constitutional violation 
should only bolster, not undermine, the right to relief. Recognizing this, 
some courts find causes of action using reasoning based on historical 
common law provisions.75 For example, in determining whether a cause of 
action exists, the New York Court of Appeals asks whether its constitution 
adopted particular common law principles from English common law and 
whether those principles suggest grounds for relief.76 Thus, because the 
prohibition on unlawful searches and seizures began with the Magna Carta, 
and at common law “[t]he civil cause of action was fully developed in 
England and provided a damage remedy for the victims of unlawful 
searches,” New York recognizes a similar cause of action under its 
constitution.77  
It is frustrating that Bosh is not grounded in common law. The English 
Crown was not immune at common law. And if the crown could face 
liability under English common law,78 then surely Oklahoma’s state 
                                                                                                                 
 72. T. Hunter Jefferson, Constitutional Wrongs and Common Law Principles: The Case 
for the Recognition of State Constitutional Tort Actions Against State Governments, 50 
VAND. L. REV. 1525, 1529 (1997). 
 73. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
407 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 74. Hibbard v. Halliday, 1916 OK 649, ¶ 8, 158 P. 1158, 1160. 
 75. Humble, supra note 60, § 3[c]. 
 76. Brown v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1129, 1138 (N.Y. 1996). 
 77. Id. at 1139. 
 78. Jefferson, supra note 72. 
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government should not be permitted to hide behind immunity. If Bosh 
signals that the Oklahoma Supreme Court will honor the legislature’s 
deliberate decision not to craft a statutory remedy for common law 
offenses, its reasoning is inimical to the liberty of Oklahoma citizens. 
c) Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics: A Potential Framework? 
The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized the right to bring a private 
cause of action under the U.S. Constitution in Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.79 The plaintiff in Bivens 
brought suit under the Fourth Amendment,80 asserting that federal agents 
violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search and 
seizures when they entered his apartment without a warrant or probable 
cause and arrested him for alleged possession of narcotics.81 Because Bosh 
suggests that neither common law nor tort law provides a remedy, Bivens 
provides a blueprint to expand the right of citizens to bring actions under 
other state constitutional provisions. 
The Bivens opinion is rooted in a rather obvious but rarely acknowledged 
notion: a state actor “possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an 
individual trespasser exercising no authority other than his own.”82 One 
way the Bill of Rights limits this harm is by preventing unreasonable 
searches and seizures by federal authority.83 When this right has been 
invaded, it is a court’s duty to “adjust [its] remedies so as to grant the 
necessary relief.”84 In Bivens’s case, for instance, the Fourth Amendment 
demanded that the Court adjust the remedy. The Fourth Amendment, after 
all, reaches farther than tort law; it prohibits some conduct that is 
permissible for private persons.85 And because of this, “[t]he interests 
protected by state laws regulating trespass and the invasion of privacy, and 
those protected by the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable 
                                                                                                                 
 79. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 80. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
 81. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. 
 82. Id. at 392. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)). 
 85. See id. (“Our cases have long since rejected the notion that the Fourth Amendment 
proscribes only such conduct as would, if engaged in by private persons, be condemned by 
state law.”). 
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searches and seizures, may be inconsistent or even hostile.”86 Consider: the 
private citizen who demands entrance into another person’s home and is 
admitted is not usually liable for trespass, while a person “who demands 
admission under a claim of federal authority stands in a far different 
position.”87  
In other words, tort law intends to regulate the behavior between private 
citizens. But this limited purpose should not preclude constitutional relief 
when the state acts illegally. Damages should of course be available for 
violating the Fourth Amendment because damages are “the ordinary 
remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty.”88 The Fourth 
Amendment may not expressly authorize a court to impose monetary 
liability on those who violate it, but this does not matter.89 As Chief Justice 
John Marshall noted, “The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in 
the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever 
he receives an injury.”90  
So the U.S. Supreme Court did not rely on tort law or historical common 
law to find for Bivens. Rather, it relied on the civil liberties embodied in the 
Fourth Amendment. That the legislature had not afforded a statutory 
remedy to its citizens was of no concern. As Justice Harlan’s concurring 
opinion framed the issue, “I do not think that the fact that the interest is 
protected by the Constitution rather than statute or common law justifies the 
assertion that federal courts are powerless to grant damages in the absence 
of explicit congressional action authorizing the remedy.”91 Congress could 
of course create statutory remedies for violations of civil rights.92 But 
congressional inaction or the lack of statutory remedy cannot deprive 
injured citizens of just compensation.  
With Bosh now barring causes of action against the state under tort law, 
citizens still need a vehicle to bring claims other than those for excessive 
force. Oklahoma should follow other states and adopt reasoning analogous 
to Bivens to ensure its citizens may sue under constitutional provisions 
other than article 2, section 30. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 86. Id. at 394. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 395. 
 89. Id. at 396. 
 90. Id. at 397 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)). 
 91. Id. at 403 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 92. See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). 
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B. The Implications of Bosh 
Both state and federal district courts are already grappling with Bosh’s 
applicability to other claims.93 This is largely because the scope of 
Oklahoma’s Bill of Rights, like the federal one, is far-reaching. The 
Oklahoma Constitution’s Article II guarantees freedom of religion (section 
5), due process (section 7), and peaceable assembly and petition (section 
3).94 It also protects the rights to vote without interference (section 4) and 
bear arms (section 26).95 And considering that the OGTCA immunizes the 
state from more than operating a jail like in Bosh, the OGTCA and the 
Oklahoma Constitution will likely conflict again—this time implicating a 
constitutional provision other than the ban on unreasonable searches.96 This 
is especially probable because the OGTCA confers broad immunity on the 
state; operating a jail is not the only immunized activity. Indeed, if it were, 
the constitutional implications of the Bosh decision would be noteworthy 
but not momentous. 
Instead, the OGTCA immunizes the state from liability for many other 
acts of state employees, including: enforcement of a court’s lawful order, 
acts of state-employed independent contractors, operation of a juvenile 
detention facility, placement of children in foster homes, and the use of 
reasonable force and other actions taken by school employees.97 
The point is this: Bosh’s tremors will eventually be felt outside of a 
correctional facility. The Oklahoma Supreme Court will one day take 
another case where the OGTCA and Oklahoma Constitution conflict. 
C. At a Crossroads: The Court’s Options Moving Forward 
Moving forward, the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s chief objective should 
be providing clarification to district courts. It could first identify other 
                                                                                                                 
 93. See, e.g., Koch v. Juber, No. CIV-13-0750-HE, 2014 WL 2171753, at *3 (W.D. 
Okla. May 23, 2014) (“Bosh does not serve to create a private right of action for all claims 
arguably arising under the Oklahoma Constitution.”); Jackson v. Okla. City Pub. Sch., 2014 
OK CIV APP 61, ¶ 10, 333 P.3d 975, 979 (dismissing Bosh claim because plaintiff had not 
been seized or arrested); Wright v. Stanley, No. CIV-11-1235-C, 2013 WL 6827946, at *2 
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 20, 2013) (declining jurisdiction “[g]iven the importance of allowing the 
Oklahoma courts to decide novel and significant issues of Oklahoma law, such as the 
breadth of the recent Bosh opinion”), vacated by No. CIV-11-1235-C, 2014 WL 1668534 
(Apr. 25, 2014). 
 94. OKLA. CONST. art. II. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. art. II, § 30. 
 97. 51 OKLA. STAT. § 155 (Supp. 2014). 
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places where the OGTCA and the Oklahoma Constitution conflict.98 
Granted, the court did not expressly decide that immunizing the state from 
liability for operating a jail is unconstitutional per se. But Bosh’s language 
suggests it is.99  
The court could also limit private causes of action to violations of article 
2, sections 9 (cruel and unusual punishment) and 30 (unreasonable force). 
Or, it could further narrow state liability to instances where excessive force 
was used. What seems more likely, however—considering the court’s 
citation to Connecticut’s Binette opinion and its lofty language on 
constitutional rights—is that it will gradually expand the number of 
Oklahoma Bill of Rights provisions under which citizens can bring private 
suits against state entities. It was Bosh’s broad language on constitutional 
rights, after all, that persuaded the Court of Civil Appeals that constitutional 
causes of action are not limited to article 2, section 30 claims.100  
But one legal hurdle presents another. If the court plans to formally 
opine, case by case and provision by provision, which specific 
constitutional provisions permit a citizen to recover from the state, this 
could span decades. Instead, district courts need a standard by which they 
can determine if a constitutional provision allows a citizen to sue. Here, 
Oklahoma should look to other states. 
1. The Self-Executing Constitutional Provision 
Bosh demonstrates that legislative obstructionism cannot prevent citizens 
from bringing constitutional causes of action. This obstructionism was 
futile; Bosh did not need the legislature to act in order to recover. 
Essentially, Bosh declared article 2, section 30 of the Oklahoma 
Constitution to be self-executing. A self-executing provision is one that is 
                                                                                                                 
 98. OKLA. CONST. art. II. 
 99. Bosh v. Cherokee Cty. Bldg. Auth., 2013 OK 9, ¶ 23, 305 P.3d 994, 1001 (noting 
that “immunizing the state completely from all liability for violations of the constitutional 
rights of its citizens . . . would also render the Constitutional protections afforded the citizens 
of this State as ineffective, and a nullity”). 
 100. GJA v. Okla. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2015 OK CIV APP 32, ¶ 30, 347 P.3d 310, 
316 (“[T]he Court has not only adjudicated a specific claim based upon a set of facts, but 
also the Court made a statement of policy (upholding constitutional guarantees and 
protections) as its broader holding. The Court then specifically applied that broader policy 
statement holding to the facts of the case.”). Still, the Court of Civil Appeals explained that 
because “[n]ot every malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance rises to the level of a 
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effective immediately without the need for any type of implementing 
action.101 These provisions bind government actors, and violating them 
automatically permits an injured party to sue.102 
Other states have identified their constitutional self-executing provisions, 
such as those guaranteeing voting rights and the rights to free speech and 
press.103 Oklahoma, though, already has standards to decide whether a 
constitutional provision is self-executing. But these standards conflict when 
applied to Oklahoma Bill of Rights provisions. For example, “A provision 
is self-executing when it can be given effect without the aid of legislation 
and there is nothing to indicate that legislation is contemplated to render it 
operative.”104 In the case of article 2, no further legislation is theoretically 
needed to protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
Granted, law enforcement—so as to act lawfully—requires courts to decide 
what searches are unreasonable. But no additional legislation is needed to 
enforce the right. 
On the other hand, the court holds that a “constitutional provision is not 
self-executing when it merely lays down general principles and does not 
supply a sufficient rule by means of which the right which it grants or 
reserves may be enjoyed and protected.”105 This seems hostile to the spirit 
of constitutional rights; a constitution chiefly aims to lay down general 
principles that will govern the legislature. Under this definition, then, no 
Bill of Rights provision in the Oklahoma Constitution is self-executing. 
Fortunately, Bosh quashes this notion by ruling for Bosh. His case 
“center[ed] around” the conflict between the Oklahoma Constitution and 
the OGTCA.106 But it also revolved around the tension between 
constitutional liberty and the court’s earlier conceptions of what qualifies as 
self-executing. 
                                                                                                                 
 101. Self-executing, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 102. David M. Gareau, Opening the Courthouse Doors: Allowing a Cause of Action to 
Arise Directly from a Violation of the Ohio Constitution, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 459, 477 
(1995). 
 103. See, e.g., Laguna Publ’g Co. v. Golden Rain Found., 182 Cal. Rptr. 813, 835 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1982) (free speech provision of California Constitution); Fenton v. Groveland 
Cmty. Servs. Dist., 185 Cal. Rptr. 758 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (voting right clause of California 
Constitution); Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines, 408 So.2d 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), 
aff’d, 432 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1983) (equal protection clause of Florida Constitution); Shields v. 
Gerhart, 658 A.2d 924, 934 (Vt. 1995) (free speech clause of Vermont Constitution). 
 104. Latting v. Cordell, 1946 OK 217, ¶ 6, 172 P.2d 397, 399. 
 105. Maddox v. Hunt, 1938 OK 495, ¶ 9, 83 P.2d 553, 556. 
 106. Bosh v. Cherokee Cty. Bldg. Auth., 2013 OK 9, ¶ 7, 305 P.3d 994, 997. 
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Without expressly saying it, the court declared article 2, section 30 to be 
self-executing when it decided that “[t]he OGTCA cannot be construed as 
immunizing the state completely from all liability for violations of the 
constitutional rights of its citizens.”107 To shield the state would “render the 
Constitutional protections afforded the citizens of this State as ineffective, 
and a nullity.”108  
The Oklahoma Bill of Rights contains thirty-seven provisions.109 It 
grants thirty-seven rights to Oklahoma citizens—rights that are all self-
executing in some fashion. Bosh was explicit: the legislature could not 
employ the OGTCA to run roughshod over the constitutional right of Bosh 
to be free from excessive force. This reasoning should apply equally to 
other constitutional rights.  
2. Concerns of the State  
The court’s faithfulness to the constitution’s spirit is laudable. But it does 
present two manageable problems for the state. First, while the OGTCA 
caps a plaintiff’s damages, Bosh offers no limit.110 The OGTCA’s ceiling 
on damages instead depends on numerous factors, such as who brings the 
claim, how many claims are being brought, and the particular state entity 
being sued.111 For example, the OGTCA caps damages at “One Hundred 
Twenty-five Thousand Dollars ($125,000.00) to any claimant for a claim 
for any other loss arising out of a single act, accident, or occurrence.”112 
Thus, if the jailers’ conduct in Bosh had not been immunized under the 
OGTCA, Bosh’s damages would be limited to $125,000 for each claim. 
Bosh, however, provides no guidance on the state’s potential monetary 
liability for constitutional violations. Until the court finds a constitutional 
limit on damages, perhaps under due process,113 recovery is theoretically 
limitless. For budgetary purposes, the state must know the amount of its 
potential liability. 
A second concern is whether a statute of limitations exists for 
constitutional violations like it does for the OGTCA, which is one year. 114 
                                                                                                                 
 107. Id. ¶ 23, 305 P.3d at 1001. 
 108. Id.  
 109. OKLA. CONST. art. II. 
 110. 51 OKLA. STAT. § 154 (2011). 
 111. Id. § 154(A)(2). 
 112. Id. 
 113. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 501 (2008). 
 114. 51 OKLA. STAT. § 156(B) (“A claim against the state or a political subdivision shall 
be forever barred unless notice thereof is presented within one (1) year after the loss 
occurs.”). 
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This one-year statute of limitations allows the state Attorney General to 
immediately investigate claims against the state.115 The Attorney General 
does not have the same luxury for state constitutional violations because 
Bosh offers no statute of limitations. Citizens are currently free to amend 
their complaints to add or bring Bosh claims years after the actual 
constitutional violation occurred. With the constitutional violations having 
begun years before, the state lacks notice to investigate the possibly 
ongoing improper conduct of its employees. Without knowledge that its 
entities are acting unconstitutionally, the state cannot be expected to 
discipline or fire its employees. Unconstitutional conduct will continue 
undisturbed. 
The court should adopt a framework to determine an appropriate statute 
of limitations and damages for Bosh claims. Federal courts provide 
guidance. When deciding 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, they simply apply the 
statute of limitations for the most analogous state statute.116 That Bosh 
claims are brought under the state constitution should not matter—the 
government still requires notice. Likewise, some state courts apply the most 
analogous state statute when deciding state constitutional claims.117 
Maryland actually applies the statute of limitations for its own 
governmental tort claims act.118 Regardless of where the statute of 
limitations comes from, Oklahoma needs one. 
Second, like the U.S. Supreme Court, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
should adopt a framework for determining a cap on damages, at least for 
punitive damages. To decide the constitutionality of a punitive damages 
award, the U.S. Supreme Court considers the degree of reprehensibility of 
the defendant’s conduct, as well as any disparity between the actual and 
potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the amount of punitive damages 
awarded.119 For example, an award significantly exceeding a single-digit 
ratio between punitive and compensatory damages will likely not survive a 
                                                                                                                 
 115. Id. § 156(C). 
 116. See Sanchez v. United States, 49 F.3d 1329, 1330 (8th Cir. 1995); Kurinsky v. 
United States, 33 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1082 (1995); Van 
Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 410 (9th Cir. 1991); Bieneman v. City of Chicago, 864 F.2d 
463, 469-70 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1080 (1989); Chin v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 
21, 23-24 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 117. See, e.g., Brown v. New York, 250 A.D.2d 314, 318 (N.Y. 1998). 
 118. Rounds v. Md. Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 75 A.3d 987, 997, cert. 
granted, 81 A.3d 457 (2013), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Rounds v. Md.-Nat’l 
Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 109 A.3d 639 (Md. 2015). 
 119. BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575-81 (1996).  
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due process challenge.120 Should Oklahoma fail to impose any cap on 
damages, an award to an injured plaintiff might fall victim to a due process 
challenge. 
V. Conclusion 
With Bosh, Oklahoma significantly advanced civil rights by 
acknowledging that the state cannot immunize itself while trampling on the 
constitutional rights of its citizens. But to limit Bosh’s scope to prisoners 
and arrestees would stall that progress. Immunizing the state for its 
unconstitutional conduct undermines Bosh’s lofty language on civil 
liberties. Perhaps the most noteworthy early challenge to sovereign 
immunity was brought by Sir Edward Coke in the seventeenth century. The 
King was not above the law, Coke argued. Rather, the “common law 
protecteth the King.” 121 That axiom is no less cogent today than it was 
centuries ago. The law protecteth the King. And today, the constitution 




                                                                                                                 
 120. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 501 (2008) (quoting State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003)). 
 121. STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 17 (8th ed. 2013). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol68/iss3/5
